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Abstract 
 
In the presence of market frictions, it is optimal for firms to stockpile cash to fund investment 
projects which may arise in the future. Prior work has documented that firms’ precautionary 
savings motives predict variation in the size of firms’ cash stockpiles. The dramatic run-up in 
cash stockpiles raises the question of why these precautionary motives have increased. In the 
presence of repatriation taxes, foreign and domestic cash are imperfect substitutes. We show that 
although precautionary motives explain variation in the level of cash held domestically, they 
provide little explanatory power for the level of foreign cash. Multinational firms’ foreign cash 
balances are instead explained by low foreign tax rates and the ability to transfer profits within 
the firm through related-party sales. The firms with the greatest incentive and ability to transfer 
income to low-tax jurisdictions do so, and this results in stockpiles of cash trapped in their 
foreign subsidiaries. 
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Understanding Precautionary Cash at Home and Abroad 
Michael W. Faulkender, Kristine W. Hankins, and Mitchell A. Petersen1 
 
According to recent Flow of Funds estimates, U.S. nonfinancial corporations are sitting on an 
aggregate cash and marketable securities position of approximately $3 trillion (see figure 1). This 
staggering amount has led to policy makers and commentators expressing concern as to why 
firms are building such large stockpiles despite an economy in recovery and a low-interest-rate 
environment, which should induce greater investment. 
 The academic literature has largely focused on the precautionary motive for retaining 
cash. Due to information asymmetries that may exist in the capital markets at the same time that 
firms are in particular need of funds, incentives exist to build cash stockpiles that reduce firm 
dependency on external capital. This need for precautionary cash increases with uncertain 
investment needs (Martin and Santomero, 1997; Boyle and Guthrie, 2003). As the large run-up 
in cash is concentrated in arguably the least constrained firms (large, profitable firms with rated 
debt), prominent papers such as Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) have focused more on the role of 
increasing investment uncertainty to explain this phenomenon. It is not clear, however, whether 
all cash is held for precautionary reasons. Where the cash is held can tell us a great deal about its 
purpose. Many firms’ cash holdings are in risky and potentially illiquid securities (Duchin et al., 
                                                          
1 The statistical analysis of firm-level data on U.S. multinational companies was conducted at the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, under arrangements that maintain legal confidentiality 
requirements. The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and do not reflect official positions of the 
U.S. Department of Commerce. We appreciate the suggestions and advice of Sergey Chernenko, Chris Parsons, 
Rene Stulz, Stephen Karolyi, Laurent Fresard, and William Zeile as well as seminar and conference participants at 
American Finance Association, Dartmouth University, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Northeastern 
University, Northwestern University, Midwest Finance Association, Ohio State, Rice University, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, the Shanghai Advanced Institute of Finance, the Swiss Finance Institute, and the 
Universities of Cincinnati, Miami, Oklahoma, Pittsburgh, Oregon, and San Diego. The research assistance of Austin 
Magee and Sang Kim is greatly appreciated. Kristine Hankins also thanks the John H. Schnatter Institute for the 
Study of Free Enterprise for financial support. 
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2015). Investing excess cash in risky and illiquid securities is the obvious way to guarantee the 
firm has capital for valuable future investment opportunities or to minimize expected distress 
costs, but it may be unavailable for current investment needs. Further, many firms hold vast sums 
of cash overseas to defer the taxation of foreign earnings (Foley et al., 2007). Given the tax 
consequences of repatriating overseas cash, it is not clear that foreign cash is a perfect substitute 
for domestically held precautionary cash—particularly when invested in illiquid securities.  
 The challenge in the literature has been to differentiate between the cash held for 
precautionary reasons versus the cash held for tax reasons. Are firms really stockpiling $3 trillion 
because they anticipate needing that much for investment purposes but fear rationing? How 
much is instead being held due to tax incentives? Does the money held for tax purposes also 
provide precautionary benefits? These are the questions we explore in this paper.  
Some have argued that firms do differentiate between cash and marketable securities so 
that bifurcation could be used to test these different explanations. However, highly liquid risk-
free marketable securities are nearly perfect substitutes for cash in fulfilling precautionary 
motives. Therefore, distinguishing on that dimension is not helpful in illuminating how these two 
motivations intersect with each other. Instead, our approach is to separate along the dimension of 
where the cash is held: domestic versus foreign. We argue that domestic cash has no tax benefits 
arising from deferral of the repatriation tax since corporate taxes (domestic and foreign) have 
already been paid on these funds. Thus, the benefits of holding cash in the U.S. are to provide 
operational liquidity and fund precautionary savings. 
On the other hand, foreign cash is almost entirely subject to incremental taxation by the 
U.S. Equity infusions from the U.S. parent into foreign subsidiaries do not generate tax 
implications if that capital is returned. However, any distribution of foreign earnings is subject to 
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tax at the positive rate differential between the U.S. tax rate and the foreign tax rate. The high 
U.S. corporate tax rate means that almost all foreign operating income would generate 
incremental tax upon repatriation to the U.S. (Graham, Hanlon, and Shevlin, 2015). 
We do not know whether foreign cash also serves as precautionary savings. On the one 
hand, this money is available in times of capital rationing. On the other hand, should those funds 
be needed domestically, the firm would need to pay the incremental tax resulting from the 
repatriation that would occur in order to invest those funds domestically. Note that while firms 
can structure a transaction avoiding repatriation tax if the proceeds are located in one non-U.S. 
subsidiary and needed in another non-U.S. subsidiary, should the funds return to the U.S., they 
will almost always be subject to tax. Depending upon the location of the funds (some foreign 
countries have no tax on corporate income, making the repatriation tax rate 35%), firms may find 
that the incremental tax exceeds the positive NPV of the investment and they optimally forgo the 
investment if only foreign funds are available. If this is the case, foreign cash serves as an 
imperfect substitute for domestic cash. They are substitutes for funding foreign investment but 
not domestic investment. This generates the empirical question of how important precautionary 
motives are in explaining foreign cash holdings.  
This separation between domestic and foreign cash is not historically possible using 
publicly available data sources. While some firms recently have voluntarily disclosed their 
foreign cash position (Harford et al., 2015), the selectively released data are limited both in scope 
and length. Therefore, the literature has not so far separately estimated the determinants of 
domestic versus foreign cash positions. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) conducts a 
mandatory survey of U.S. multinational companies that generates the data that are needed to 
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address this shortcoming.2 From this survey, we are able to measure how much cash and 
marketable securities firms are holding in each foreign subsidiary. Combining this with the 
disclosure of their total cash and marketable securities position (from Compustat), we are able to 
calculate how much cash is held domestically. 
We proceed by first regressing the total cash position of the firm on variables that have 
previously been documented to explain some of the observed cross-sectional variation in 
corporate cash positions (Opler et al., 1999; Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009). After showing that 
the baseline specifications are similar to what has been found in the prior literature, we replicate 
these specifications separately for the cash held domestically and the cash held abroad. The 
results are striking. The aggregate cash position is explained by a variety of firm characteristics 
associated with precautionary motives, such as growth opportunities and leverage. It also is 
inversely related to the Faulkender and Smith (2015) effective tax rate (an average of the U.S. 
and foreign tax rates which firms face given the location of their foreign operations). Firms with 
higher average tax rates hold less cash.  
Breaking out the domestic and foreign cash positions separately provides additional 
insight. For multinationals, the effective tax rate does not explain domestic cash levels. However, 
for foreign cash holdings, the estimated coefficient is highly negative, both economically and 
statistically. This implies that firms with lower effective tax rates hold more foreign cash, 
consistent with the Foley et al. (2007) argument that if firms are confronting lower tax rates 
abroad, their repatriation tax is higher, and this incentivizes the stockpiling of foreign cash. A 
firm’s strategic choice to reduce its effective tax rate is something we will discuss below, but this 
divergence between drivers of foreign and domestic cash is consistent with firms moving cash 
                                                          
2 The company-level data from this mandatory survey, which by law are confidential, are collected for the purpose 
of producing publicly available aggregate statistics on the operations of multinational companies. 
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abroad when there is less need for precautionary cash. Importantly, proxies for precautionary 
motives are not relevant for explaining foreign cash. Precautionary motives are the main drivers 
of firms’ domestic cash levels. The variables used in the prior literature to measure firms’ capital 
constraints and risk, and which have predicted total cash, also predict domestic cash. A firm’s 
effective marginal tax rate (the foreign tax rate it faces) has little ability to explain the firm’s 
domestic cash holdings. Our results show that the factors that explain domestic and foreign cash 
holdings are quite distinct. 
After isolating the precautionary motives for holding cash, we are able to delve further 
into the tax motives. Often, overseas cash held by U.S. firms is referred to as trapped. Yet there 
is broad evidence that intellectual property royalties and transfer payments facilitate the 
offshoring of income to low-tax jurisdictions (Grubert and Mutti, 1991; Levin and McCain, 
2013; Kanter, 2014). Firms with intellectual property, whether it consists of patents, trademarks, 
or licensing deals, may be able to adjust the ownership and within-firm pricing of the IP to 
transfer revenues from higher-taxed regions to affiliates in low-tax havens. This transfer pricing 
is a deliberate relocation of earnings to affiliates and contrasts with the notion that trapped 
overseas cash is a byproduct of international business activity. Specifically, we calculate how 
much the revenue of the firm’s subsidiaries is generated by sales to other subsidiaries. Under the 
hypothesis that firms structure the location of their intellectual property to take advantage of low 
corporate income tax rates in some foreign jurisdictions, we expect firms with subsidiaries in 
low-tax jurisdictions to do more internal (affiliated) sales. This enables them to move earnings to 
lower-tax countries, but also results in larger cash and marketable securities portfolios held 
abroad—now “trapped” in low-tax subsidiaries. That is exactly what we find. Further 
examination reveals that this result is entirely explained by firms engaged in significant R&D. 
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The result does not hold for firms which are not engaged in R&D. Firms with intellectual 
property have the greatest ability to control their taxes using within-firm transfers.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes our data and empirical 
strategy. Section 2 presents our results, while the channel of affiliated sales and transfer pricing 
is explored in section 3. The final section concludes. 
 
Empirical Strategy and Data 
Empirical Design 
Our objective is to better understand the increases in firms’ liquidity positions that have been 
observed recently. In particular, we explore how much of the significant cash positions of firms 
is explained by concerns about the accessibility of external capital (precautionary savings) 
relative to the portion that is arising from international tax considerations. To distinguish 
between these factors, we estimate the factors which explain a firm’s level of domestic and 
foreign cash, and thus can test whether the motivations that drive firms to stockpile cash are the 
same for domestic and foreign cash. 
Our approach is to first establish a baseline regression specification that draws from 
many of the factors that have been previously identified to explain cash holdings. We estimate 
the total cash holdings of firms (as a percentage of their book assets) as a function of standard 
determinants of cash similar to Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009). Specifically, we control for firm 
size (as measured by the natural log of sales), whether the firm has a bond rating, asset 
tangibility (the PP&E-to-book assets ratio), profitability (return on assets), R&D to sales, 
advertising to sales, market-to-book, book leverage, and capital expenditure to assets. After 
reconciling our estimates with those that have been previously documented for total cash, we 
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move to separately estimating this specification for the cash that is held in the U.S. and for the 
cash that is held abroad. The domestic cash specification is estimated both for all firms and just 
for those that have international operations (multinational corporations, or MNCs).  
Since precautionary savings are motivated by concerns about financial constraints, our 
examination includes additional factors that have previously been employed to identify the extent 
to which firms may be currently financially constrained or concerned about becoming 
constrained in the future. Following Faulkender and Petersen (2012), we measure the likelihood 
that firms’ internally generated cash may have been insufficient to fully fund their investment 
opportunities. Specifically, we take the percentage of the previous three years of the firm’s 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (which is after advertising and 
R&D) less capital expenditures. The higher this percentage, the more likely it is that firms have 
had investment opportunities that have been forgone. Arguably firms with sufficient operating 
cash flow to fund investment should not be capital constrained. Anticipating such investment 
needs, these firms are more likely to build precautionary savings reserves when capital markets 
are accessible. 
We follow the recent literature and include two distinct measures of risk in our 
precautionary savings specifications. Following Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), we include the 
industry cash flow risk. For each two-digit SIC group, we calculate a 10-year moving average of 
the standard deviation of cash flow from assets. This measure captures historical evidence of 
cash flow volatility. We also include a forward-looking measure of risk which affects the need 
for precautionary cash. We capture changing product market threats using the product market 
fluidity measure from Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2014), which is found to affect cash 
balances. The fluidity measure uses text analysis of product descriptions of both a firm and its 
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rivals to measure the dynamics of a firm’s product market competition. Higher overlapping word 
use indicates a greater threat and, thus, fluidity is a forward-looking measure of risk (details are 
available on Hoberg’s website).  
Moving to the tax motivations of cash holdings, we follow Faulkender and Smith (2015) 
and use an international blended tax rate. The measure is a weighted average of the marginal 
statutory tax rate (based on the firm’s EBIT). The weights are the percentage of EBIT (earnings 
before interest and taxes) generated in each affiliate in the corresponding fiscal year in the 
specified tax jurisdiction of that affiliate (subsidiary). So if 50 percent of EBIT in 2006 were 
generated in the United States, 30 percent in the Irish foreign affiliate, and the remaining 20 
percent in the German affiliate, the estimated tax rate for 2006 for this firm is  
 Firm,2006 US,2006 Ireland,2006 Germany,2006τ =50% τ +30% τ +20% τ . (1) 
This blended tax rate represents our estimate of the tax rate confronting firms prior to using 
interest expense to shield such income from taxation. As this weighted average rate increases, we 
would expect the firm to hold less foreign cash because the realized deferral benefits are lower. 
Stated differently, it is the firms that generate the greatest amount of earnings in low-tax 
jurisdictions that would most benefit from deferring repatriation and stockpiling the foreign 
earnings in cash and marketable securities. Finding a negative relationship between a firm’s 
worldwide average tax rate and its cash holdings would provide evidence consistent with this 
hypothesis (e.g., Foley et al., 2007). 
 The next question is to determine which kinds of firms are best able to manage their 
operations in a way that mitigates taxes and thus results in trapped cash. Anecdotally, there is 
evidence that the effect is particularly pronounced in firms with high intellectual property that 
are able to utilize transfer pricing and royalty payments to move earnings from high-tax to low-
11 
 
tax jurisdictions. We therefore would expect that the firms that have significant sales from one 
subsidiary to another, relative to external sales, are those most able to engage in this type of 
international tax planning. We construct a measure equal to the percentage of the firm’s total 
revenue accounted for by sales of its foreign subsidiaries to either the parent company or to 
related subsidiaries. We hypothesize that the tax effect should be greatest among those firms that 
are particularly adept at using affiliated sales to move income across various tax jurisdictions. 
 
Data Sources 
The challenge associated with engaging in any of these analyses is the lack of publicly available 
data regarding the international operations of firms. The information disclosed in firms’ 10-Ks is 
entirely too coarse to understand where firms are operating, the tax jurisdiction to which they are 
subject, and the amount of cash and marketable securities they hold in these various locations. 
Fortunately, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) conducts an annual survey of U.S. 
multinationals that contains numerous balance sheet and income statement items for each foreign 
affiliate of a U.S.-based multinational firm. The U.S. multinationals are required by law to 
complete the survey. We use the BEA multinational affiliate data to measure the portion of a 
firm’s total cash which is held domestically or in one of its international affiliates. 
Specifically we employ data from the BEA’s benchmark (BE-10) and annual surveys 
(BE-11) of U.S. multinational companies, which include information on the assets and 
profitability of the foreign affiliates of multinational firms.3 Because we are interested in the 
                                                          
3 The benchmark (BE-10) survey, conducted every five years (1994, 1999, 2004, and 2009), has more 
comprehensive coverage of the accounting data for the smaller foreign subsidiaries than the annual (BE-11) survey, 
which is conducted in interim years. The BEA estimates these accounting items for the intervening four years 
between the comprehensive surveys. Our results are robust to confining our analysis to only the years in which the 
more comprehensive survey is conducted. 
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cash allocations of firms as well as variation in the foreign tax rates multinational firms confront, 
our firm-year observations are limited to the years during which the necessary data were 
gathered. These data are available from 1998 to 2008. Using these data, we are able to measure 
the amount of cash and estimate the marketable securities held in their foreign subsidiaries. The 
annual survey (BE-11) explicitly includes the amount of cash in each foreign subsidiary as well 
as inventory and “other current assets.” To estimate the marketable securities which are 
contained in other assets, we subtract out an estimate of the subsidiaries’ accounts receivable 
from other assets by assuming the accounts receivable-to-sales ratio is the same across the firm. 
Our estimate of the cash and marketable securities is thus4  
 
firm
Subsidiary
firm
Accounts ReceivableCash+ Other current assets- Sales
Sales
  
  
  
. (2) 
This approach assumes the rest of other assets is marketable securities, as a first pass. The 
difference between the total cash position of the firm and the sum of the cash in its foreign 
affiliates is our estimate of the domestic cash position of firms each year.5 We replicate our 
results using only cash, opposed to our estimate of cash and marketable securities from equation 
2, and the results are essentially the same. These results are available in the online appendix. 
We also use these data to construct our estimate of the average worldwide tax rate 
confronting these firms (equation 1). Following Faulkender and Smith (2015), we use tax code 
                                                          
4 If this value is less than the reported cash value, we use the reported cash value.  
5 As the benchmark (BE-10) surveys differ from the annual BE-11 surveys, we estimate cash and marketable 
securities differently in these years. In the benchmark years, our estimate is cash plus other current receivables plus 
other current assets (which includes certificates of deposit) plus other equity investments (which includes the 
noncurrent portion of marketable securities, cash on deposit, CDs, and additional equity investments). In the annual 
surveys (BE-11) these variables are combined in other current assets along with accounts receivables. Thus in the 
annual survey, we subtract out an estimate of accounts receivable for consistency (see equation 2). In a small 
number of cases, our estimate of foreign cash is greater than total cash. In these cases, we define total cash as equal 
to foreign cash and domestic cash as zero. Dropping these observations does not alter our main results. 
13 
 
information for foreign jurisdictions provided by Comtax for the years 2006 to 2008. For the 
period 1998 to 2005, we utilize data from the KPMG Corporate and Indirect Tax Survey. For all 
other control variables, we use the Compustat data that are provided by Standard & Poor’s based 
upon annual 10-K filings. Control variables—including firm size (the natural logarithm of sales), 
profitability (EBIT over book assets), asset tangibility (the ratio of PP&E to book assets), growth 
opportunities (measured by the ratio of R&D to sales and the market-to-book ratio), and whether 
the firm has a bond rating any month during the fiscal year—are from Compustat. All of these 
measures are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 
Summary Statistics: Location and Magnitude of Cash Holdings  
We know firms have significant cash holdings. Based on the Federal Reserve’s Flow of 
Funds, the total cash and marketable securities on the balance sheet of U.S. firms has risen from 
under $1 trillion in 1998 to over $3 trillion by 2014 (see figure 1). Relative to GDP cash has 
risen almost 50 percent over this time period. This consistent and persistent rise in cash levels is 
difficult to reconcile with a purely precautionary motive. For the rise in cash to be solely due to 
the precautionary motivations the risk which firms face must have been rising consistently over 
the last two decades. The increase in risk prior to the financial crisis (2008) would have to be 
similar to the rise after the financial crisis to explain figure 1. 
For the average firm, most of their cash is held domestically (see table 1, full sample). 
This observation arises for two reasons. First, a large fraction of the firms in Compustat do not 
have foreign operations, and thus their foreign cash is zero. When we examine multinational 
firms (MNCs), the amount of cash held abroad is larger but is still only 42 percent for the 
average firm (see table 1, multinationals sample). A second reason it appears that most cash is 
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held domestically is the correlation between firm size and having foreign operations. The larger 
size of firms with foreign operations means that the fraction of cash held abroad is even larger 
when we weight the data by firm size or when we look at cash opposed to cash relative to assets 
for each firm (table 1). Although the average firm holds 42 percent of its cash abroad (weighting 
firms equally), 64 percent of the cash of MNCs is held abroad over our sample period (weighting 
each dollar equally). This implies that the cash holdings are concentrated. 
 
Figure 1: Aggregate Corporate Cash − Flow of Funds 
 
 
Notes: The data are from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, Table L. 102 Nonfinancial Business (December 15, 2015). 
We summed rows 2 through 11. This includes checking and savings accounts of nonfinancial businesses as well as 
investment in debt securities (e.g., commercial paper, government bonds, and loans). The data are from 1998 to 2014. 
 
Foreign and domestic firms differ by more than size. Compared to domestic firms, firms 
with foreign operations are more profitable, have lower market-to-book ratios, are more likely to 
pay dividends, are more likely to have access to the bond market (e.g., a bond rating), and invest 
less in R&D. These are variables that are normally associated with greater capital market access, 
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not less. Before turning to explanations of firms’ cash holdings, it is useful to examine where 
most of the cash is held (e.g., by industry and location).  
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
 Full Sample Multinationals 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Foreign Cash to Assets 0.015 0.248 0.089 0.147 
Domestic Cash to Assets 0.210 0.245 0.122 0.179 
Total Cash to Assets 0.225 0.249 0.211 0.206 
Effective Tax Rate 0.347 0.022 0.330 0.051 
Ln(Sales) 4.788 2.505 6.656 1.982 
Firm Has Bond Rating 0.209 0.406 0.453 0.498 
PPE to Assets 0.276 0.247 0.250 0.193 
Return on Assets −0.018 0.322 0.104 0.152 
Firm Pays Dividends 0.325 0.468 0.480 0.500 
R&D to Sales 0.199 0.597 0.073 0.245 
Market-to-Book 3.179 3.151 2.275 2.128 
Book Leverage 0.380 0.502 0.372 0.384 
Capital Expenditure/Assets 0.066 0.093 0.049 0.053 
 
Notes: This table contains the means and standard deviations of the foreign, domestic, and total cash-to-assets ratios as 
well as the control variables used in the analysis. The statistics are provided for both the full sample over the panel’s 
sample period as well as for only those in the BEA multinational survey. Data definitions can be found in the text. 
 
 
 Lower tax rates in some foreign jurisdictions create an incentive to earn income and thus 
stockpile cash in these countries. However, firms also earn income and thus may stockpile cash 
in a country for strictly economic reasons (this is where the business and investments are 
located). Our data allow us to identify not only that the cash is held abroad but also to identify 
the countries in which the foreign subsidiaries are located. In figure 2, we report the percentage 
of foreign cash held in the top 15 countries in 1998 in the bar graph on the left. The bar graph on 
the right reports the fraction of sales by the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. MNCs that originate in 
each country. The countries are sorted in both bar graphs by the fraction of foreign cash in the 
country, with the countries with the most cash listed at the bottom of the bar. Among the 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Cash and Sales across Subsidiary Countries (1998) 
 
 
Notes: The percentage of foreign cash (left bar graph) and sales (right bar graph) which is held in the foreign subsidiary 
of U.S. multinationals in 1998 is graphed above. All foreign countries in the data set are included, and the 15 countries 
with the highest level of cash are labeled. In both columns the countries are sorted by the fraction of cash held in 1998. 
Thus foreign subsidiaries in the United Kingdom held the most cash in 1998. The United Kingdom subsidiaries held 
14.6 percent of foreign cash, and 14.8 percent of foreign sales were made by subsidiaries located in the United 
Kingdom. 
 
 
countries with high cash balances, we see large economies (e.g., the United Kingdom, Germany, 
France, Canada, and Japan), where we would expect U.S. multinationals to conduct significant 
business, as well as smaller countries (e.g., the Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium, and Bermuda), 
which we might expect to be a smaller fraction of U.S. firms’ foreign operations. The fraction of 
foreign cash and the fraction of foreign sales are relatively similar across countries. For example, 
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subsidiaries located in the United Kingdom hold the largest fraction of foreign cash in 1998 at 
14.6 percent, and these subsidiaries generated 14.8 percent of all foreign sales in 1998. 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of Cash and Sales across Subsidiary Countries (2008) 
 
 
Notes: The percentage of foreign cash (left bar graph) and sales (right bar graph) which is held in the foreign subsidiary 
of U.S. multinationals in 2008 is graphed above. All foreign countries in the data set are included, and the 15 countries 
with the highest level of cash are labeled. In both columns the countries are sorted by the fraction of cash held in 2008. 
Thus foreign subsidiaries in Ireland held the most cash in 2008. The Irish subsidiaries held 13.1 percent of foreign 
cash, and 4.0 percent of foreign sales were made by subsidiaries located in Ireland. 
 
 
The allocation of foreign cash changed by 2008 (see figure 3). Ireland moved from third-
highest allocation of foreign cash to first (9.0% of foreign cash to 13.1%). Other countries that 
moved up in the rankings include Bermuda (4.2% to 9.9% of foreign cash) and Luxembourg 
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(less than 1.9% to 5.5%). These three countries have significantly higher percentage of cash than 
percentage of sales. For example, Irish subsidiaries held 13.1 percent of the cash, but generated 
only 4.0 percent of the sales in 2008. Part of the shift between 1998 and 2008 is firms increasing 
their stockpile of cash in countries that had low tax rates even in 1998. Part of the shift is due to 
some countries lowering their corporate tax rate and thus becoming more desirable locations to 
earn income on a tax basis (see figure 4). For example between 1998 and 2008, the effective tax 
rate dropped from 32 percent to 12.5 percent in Ireland and from 35 percent to 24.3 percent in  
 
Figure 4: Corporate Tax Rates: U.S. and Foreign Rates 
 
 
 
Notes: The figure graphs the top U.S. corporate tax rate and the average corporate tax rate across the following foreign 
countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Ireland, Italy, France, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. These are the countries in the top 15 of cash holdings (see figure 2) where the tax-
rate data were available from the OECD website.6 
 
                                                          
6 http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/tax-database.htm#C_CorporateCaptial (before 2000) and 
http://stats.oecd.org//Index.aspx?QueryId=58204 (2000 and after). The data for Japan are not reported before 1990 
and for Luxembourg before 2000. These countries are excluded from the average in these years.  
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the Netherlands, and even Germany’s rate dropped from 56.6 percent to 30.9 percent.7 The 
greater difference between U.S. tax rates and foreign tax rates and possibly firms’ greater ability 
to shift income across countries may have led to the changes we see between figures 2 and 3.  
Table 2 highlights these changes in tax rates. It presents the statutory tax rate for every 
country included in figures 2 and 3 for both 1998 and 2008. The four (or six) locations with the 
most cash change over time. In 1998, multinationals concentrate cash holdings in countries with 
average tax rates above 35 percent, but, by 2008, the cash is concentrated in locations with an 
average tax rate below 21 percent. There also is a growing disconnect between sales and cash. In 
1998, cash and sales are similar in countries where multinationals hold the most cash. By the end 
of the sample, sales are less concentrated in those locations with high cash holdings. We now 
turn to an analysis of the determinants of cash holdings both domestic and foreign.  
 
Determinants of Cash Holdings and Location 
Precautionary Motives 
Our first set of regressions examines the total cash and marketable securities of the firms in our 
sample as a function of firm characteristics that have previously been shown to explain the cash 
position of firms. As we investigate the determinants of firms’ cash holdings, we will examine 
variation across firms with and without foreign operations. Among the firms with foreign 
operations, we can examine the determinants of their domestic and foreign cash holdings. 
Consistent with prior work such as Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), we find evidence of a   
                                                          
7 These tax rates are taken from the OECD website and represent the top corporate tax rate:  
 http://stats.oecd.org//Index.aspx?QueryId=58204 and 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/tax-database.htm#C_CorporateCaptial.  
Table 2: Cash, Sales, and Geography 
 
1998  2008 
  Cash Sales Tax Rate    Cash Sales Tax
 Rate 
United Kingdom 14.60% 14.80% 27.30%  Ireland 13.10% 4.00% 12.50% 
Netherlands 10.40% 5.80% 35.00%  United Kingdom 11.10% 12.70% 26.10% 
Ireland 9.00% 2.00% 32.00%  Bermuda  9.90% 1.10% 0.00% 
Germany 6.90% 10.60% 56.60%  Netherlands 9.90% 4.70% 24.30% 
Belgium 5.80% 2.50% 37.20%  Belgium 5.60% 2.40% 31.10% 
France 5.40% 6.00% 41.70%  Luxembourg 5.50% 0.40% 0.00% 
Switzerland 5.10% 2.90% 27.80%  Canada 5.00% 10.00% 30.90% 
Canada 4.30% 11.10% 44.60%  Germany 4.60% 7.00% 30.90% 
Bermuda  4.20% 0.60% 0.00%  Switzerland  4.10% 4.50% 7.80% 
Italy 3.50% 3.10% 33.00%  France 2.90% 3.90% 34.40% 
Singapore 2.90% 3.20% 26.00%  Australia 2.50% 2.90% 30.00% 
Japan 2.60% 7.80% 51.60%  Japan 2.20% 5.40% 43.00% 
Australia 2.10% 2.80% 36.00%  Singapore 1.90% 4.90% 18.00% 
Brazil 2.00% 3.60% 25.00%  Italy 1.70% 2.60% 27.50% 
Spain 1.90% 2.10% 35.00%  China 1.60% 3.50% 25.00% 
All Others 19.30% 21.00%    All Others 18.30% 30.20%   
          
Top 4 Countries 40.90% 33.30% 37.70%  Top 4 Countries 44.00% 22.50% 15.70% 
Top 6 Countries 52.10% 41.80% 38.30%  Top 6 Countries 55.10% 25.30% 20.40% 
 
Notes: This table contains statistics at the country-subsidiary level as well as aggregated for the four (or six) countries with the most cash. It reports the percentage 
of foreign cash (first column for each time period) and sales (second column) which is held in the foreign subsidiary of U.S. multinationals. All foreign countries in 
the data set are included, and the 15 countries with the highest level of cash are reported individually for each time period. In both 1998 and 2008, the countries 
are sorted by the fraction of cash held in that year. Thus foreign subsidiaries in the United Kingdom held the most cash in 1998, and 14.8 percent of foreign sales 
were made in subsidiaries located in the United Kingdom. In 2008, foreign subsidiaries in Ireland held the most cash in 2008, but only 4.0 percent of foreign sales 
were made by subsidiaries located in Ireland. Tax rate is the country’s statutory tax rate as per Faulkender and Smith (2016).  
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Table 3: Baseline Cash Regressions 
 
 I  II III IV V 
 Total
 Cash 
 
Total Cash 
 
Domestic 
Cash 
Domestic 
Cash 
Foreign 
Cash 
 All Firms MNC All Firms MNC MNC 
Effective Tax Rate -0.720* -0.701* 0.085 0.060 -0.761* 
 (0.072) (0.074) (0.047) (0.048) (0.076) 
Ln(Firm Sales) -0.016* -0.0061 -0.017* -0.012* 0.0061 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Has Bond Rating 0.0101 0.003 0.007 -0.005 0.008 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) 
PPE/Book Assets -0.319* -0.270* -0.311* -0.198* -0.072* 
 (0.006) (0.017) (0.006) (0.013) (0.014) 
Return on Assets 0.027* -0.0771 0.032* -0.009 -0.0685 
 (0.006) (0.029) (0.005) (0.023) (0.032) 
Firm Pays Dividends -0.013* -0.028* -0.015* -0.035* 0.007 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
R&D/Sales 0.136* 0.202* 0.136* 0.202* 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.017) (0.003) (0.018) (0.011) 
Market/Book 0.004* 0.009* 0.004* 0.009* -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Book Leverage -0.097* -0.104* -0.096* -0.103* -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) 
Capital Exp/Sales 0.082* 0.217* 0.075* 0.149* 0.068 
 (0.011) (0.042) (0.011) (0.035) (0.036) 
Domestic Firm  -0.016*  0.057*   
 (1 if yes) (0.004)  (0.004)   
Observations 78,103 13,113 78,103 13,113 13,113 
R2 0.392 0.305 0.412 0.336 0.094    
 
Notes: The table contains regressions of the ratio of the firm’s cash to book assets on a set of firm characteristics. Cash is 
total cash (columns I and II), domestic cash (columns III and IV), and foreign cash (column V). The entire sample is 
included in the regression in columns I and III. Only multinational firms (MNCs) are included in the sample in columns 
II, IV, and V. Each regression contains year dummies. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Statistical significance at 
the 0.1, 1, and 5 percent levels is reported as superscripts *, 1, and 5, respectively. 
 
 
precautionary motive for stockpiling cash when we look at the total cash firms hold, 
independently of where they hold it. The results are broadly consistent if we examine all firms 
(see table 3, column I) or only multinational firms (firms with foreign profits; see table 3, column 
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II). Firms that are larger, have greater asset tangibility (PPE to book assets), pay dividends, 
conduct less R&D, and have lower market-to-book ratios and higher leverage ratios all hold less 
cash. Traditionally, these results have been interpreted as consistent with the precautionary 
savings motivation as these characteristics are associated with firms that are less likely to be 
capital rationed and would therefore derive less benefit from stockpiling cash. These patterns 
hold for both the full sample as well as the subsample of multinational firms, and the coefficients 
are broadly of the same magnitude. In addition, the coefficient on our estimated tax-rate variable 
is negative and statistically significant, consistent with Foley et al. (2007), implying that those 
firms confronting lower average tax rates hold more (trapped) cash. Remember however that 
variation in our estimated tax rate comes entirely from the portion of a firm’s earnings that are 
realized overseas and the tax rate in the countries in which those earnings are generated. 
Although this coefficient is consistent with foreign taxes influencing the total amount of cash a 
firm holds, as we will discuss below, the story is richer.  
Given the results are consistent with the previous literature, we now can examine whether 
the determinants of cash holdings are the same for domestic and foreign cash holdings. In the 
remaining columns of table 3, we run the regressions for domestic and foreign cash separately. 
The first thing to note is that many of the variables which are related to precautionary motives 
are relevant only for explaining the domestic cash held by multinationals. The precautionary 
savings motivations are a significant determinant of the observed variation in the domestic cash 
and marketable securities positions of firms, whether we look at all firms (table 3, column III) or 
only multinational firms (column IV). As with total cash, firms that are larger, pay dividends, 
have greater asset tangibility (PPE to book assets), and have more debt in their capital structure 
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hold less domestic cash.8 Firms that engage in significant R&D and have high market-to-book 
ratios hold significantly larger domestic cash positions.9 These results are consistent with the 
types of firms most likely to be rationed, holding more domestic cash to mitigate potential 
underinvestment that may result from such rationing. 
Interestingly, these precautionary savings motivations do not explain variation in foreign 
cash holdings. We see that many of the firm characteristics that explained domestic cash (column 
IV) and are often interpreted as associated with precautionary savings motivations have little 
predictive power in explaining a firm’s foreign cash positions (table 3, column V). The 
coefficients either shrink, lose statistical significance, or in one case (firm size) flip signs. Firms 
with more tangible assets hold less foreign cash, although the coefficient is 77 percent smaller. 
Our growth proxies (the R&D-to-sales ratio and the market-to-book ratio) and whether a firm 
pays a dividend have estimated coefficients that are appreciably smaller economically and no 
longer statistically different from zero (even though the standard errors are the same or smaller). 
For example, the R&D coefficient has decreased to effectively zero. In addition, variables 
explaining capital rationing like whether the firm pays dividends and its leverage ratio have 
shrunk in magnitude and are no longer statistically significant. Precautionary motives are an 
important determinant of a firm’s domestic cash holdings (whether a firm is multinational or 
not), but not of a firm’s foreign cash holdings.  
 
                                                          
8 If we do not include the firm’s leverage, these results are even stronger (the coefficients are larger in magnitude). 
Results are available from the authors.  
9 Based on the estimates from table 3, column III (all firms), increasing the market-to-book ratio by 3.151 (the 
standard deviation from table 1, column II) increases domestic cash by 1.3 percent of the book value of assets (0.004 
* 3.151), while increasing R&D by one standard deviation (0.597 from table I, column II) leads to an 8.1 percent 
increase in cash to assets. These numbers can be compared to the average domestic cash-to-asset ratio of 21 percent 
(table 1). 
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Tax Rate Effects  
When we examined total cash holdings, we found that the tax rate was negatively correlated with 
firms’ cash holdings. Firms with higher tax rates hold less cash. When we examine domestic and 
foreign cash we find very different results. Higher tax rates are associated with slightly higher, 
not lower, domestic cash levels whether we examine the entire sample (column III) or only 
multinationals (column IV). The coefficient switches signs, drops appreciably in magnitude, and 
is no longer statistically different from zero.10 The effect of taxes which we found for total cash 
is driven completely by the foreign cash holding of MNCs. MNCs with lower effective tax rates 
hold more cash abroad as is expected given the cross-sectional variation in the cost of 
repatriating foreign earnings. The coefficient estimate in column V implies increasing the 
effective tax rate by 5.1 percentage points (the standard deviation from table 1) reduces the cash-
to-assets ratio by 3.9 percentage points.11 
 
Capital Constraints  
To the extent that the precautionary savings motivation explains cash holdings, these findings 
should be particularly acute for the firms most likely to confront capital constraints. Thus, we 
                                                          
10 In the total sample regressions, we also include a dummy variable which is equal to one if the firm is domestic 
(has no foreign operations) and zero otherwise. The coefficient in column III is 0.056, meaning domestic firms have 
cash holdings which are 5.6 percent of book assets greater then foreign firms holding all other variables constant. 
MNCs have less domestic cash, all else being equal, and have more cash held abroad (by construction). Since the 
average Effective Tax Rate is higher for domestic firms than MNCs, if we included this effect the result would be 
even larger. MNCs’ total cash, controlling for firm characteristics, is slightly smaller than domestic firms (β=−0.015; 
table 3, column I). The simple averages in table 1 show the same result. This is inconsistent with the summary 
statistics of Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2015), which suggest MNCs hold more cash.  
11 How much of the rise in cash we see in figure 1 is due to changes in the independent variables versus a systematic 
rise in cash (unrelated to change in the explanatory variables)? The time dummies, which are included in table 3, can 
help answer this question. For the regressions based on the full sample (columns I and III), the time dummies imply 
an increase in the cash-to-asset ratio of about 2 percent above and beyond any changes in the precautionary savings 
or tax variables. The time dummies in the foreign cash regression (column V) show variability over the sample 
period (from −0.5 percent to 1.0 percent, but there is no systematic increase over the sample period. Thus, any 
change in the level of foreign cash is driven by changes in the independent variables.  
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reexamine our results by adding in the Faulkender and Petersen (2012) measure of capital 
constraints that captures whether a firm’s investment expenditures exceed their internally 
generated funds. Recognize that if firms’ operations are sufficient to fund all of their investment 
opportunities, then they need not rely on external capital or an internal stockpile. However, for 
those firms with investment expenditures in excess of their internally generated funds, they are 
likely to stockpile cash when capital markets are accessible and then hold this cash and 
marketable securities should they need it to fund investment in the future. We add this variable to 
our baseline specification and examine the results for domestic versus foreign cash in table 4. 
Firms which are more likely to be capital constrained hold higher domestic cash levels. 
The estimated coefficient suggests that the cash-to-assets ratio is 13.1 percentage points higher 
for those firms which invested more in each of the last three years than their realized operating 
cash flow in those corresponding years relative to a firm whose investment never exceeded its 
internally generated cash flow (table 4, column I). Firms which are more constrained also hold 
more foreign cash, but the coefficient is 82 percent smaller (0.024/0.131 − 1; see column 2). 
These results again suggest that the precautionary savings motivation has strong explanatory 
power in explaining domestic cash but is less important in explaining the variation in foreign 
cash positions.  
 
Measures of Risk  
Precautionary savings are more valuable to firms whose cash flows are riskier. Should firms’ 
operations be negatively shocked, not only will their internal capital-generating capacity be 
impaired, this would likely coincide with facing larger costs of external funds. If firms need cash, 
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either to overcome a temporary shock to their operations or to fund valuable investment that will 
allow them to adapt to the shock, then having a large cash stockpile is more valuable. 
In table 4, we examine two different measures of risk—industry cash flow volatility and 
product market fluidity—and again estimate how these measures correlate with domestic versus 
foreign cash positions. Following Bates et al., we incorporate the standard deviation of the firm’s 
cash flow, measured over the previous five fiscal years, into our cash regression. Higher cash 
flow risk is positively associated with the firm’s domestic cash position (table 4, column III). 
The effect is economically and statistically significant. Cash flow risk has a smaller and 
statistically insignificant effect on multinational firms’ foreign cash (column IV). We examine 
the product market fluidity of the firm as a more forward-looking measure of investment 
uncertainty in columns V and VI. This variable measures the competitive product market threat 
to the firm and has been documented by Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala to affect cash holdings. 
Product market fluidity risk is positively associated with the domestic cash position of firms, 
consistent with the precautionary motivation. Its estimated association with foreign cash is 
actually negative, and the coefficient is 67 percent smaller in magnitude, indicating that greater 
product market competition is correlated with lower foreign cash holdings. Although total cash is 
higher (the sum of the coefficients in columns V and VI is positive), more than 100 percent of 
the increase is in domestic cash.  
The effect of taxes is the same as we saw in table 3. Even after controlling for risk and 
capital constraints, firms with lower effective tax rates (from low-tax foreign jurisdictions) hold 
significantly more foreign cash. They hold more domestic cash, but the effect is smaller and not 
always statistically significant.  
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Table 4: Capital Constraints and Additional Risk  
 
 I II III IV V VI 
 
Domestic  
Cash 
Foreign  
Cash 
Domestic  
Cash 
Foreign 
Cash 
Domestic  
Cash 
Foreign 
Cash 
Effective Tax Rate 0.1025 -0.764* 0.057 -0.772* 0.1181 -0.768* 
 (0.047) (0.077) (0.049) (0.078) (0.048) (0.079) 
Years Constrained (%) 0.131* 0.0245     
  (0.012) (0.011)     
StDev(Cash Flow)   0.132* 0.039   
   (0.036) (0.026)   
Product Market Fluidity     0.012* -0.004* 
     (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln(Firm Sales) -0.007* 0.008* -0.010* 0.0071 -0.016* 0.010* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Has Bond Rating -0.007 0.009 -0.006 0.008 -0.005 0.006 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
PPE /Book Assets -0.214* -0.086* -0.178* -0.077* -0.164* -0.067* 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) 
Return on Assets 0.131* -0.066 0.028 -0.0845 -0.021 -0.109* 
 (0.023) (0.039) (0.024) (0.034) (0.025) (0.030) 
Firm Pays Dividends -0.030* 0.010  -0.034* 0.009 -0.021* 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
R&D/Sales 0.215* -0.005 0.224* -0.004 0.153* 0.003 
 (0.021) (0.013) (0.021) (0.013) (0.020) (0.011) 
Market/Book 0.012* 0.001 0.011* 0.001 0.023* 0.008* 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Book Leverage -0.098* -0.003 -0.098* -0.002 -0.100* 0.006 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) 
Capital Exp/Sales -0.024 0.041 0.144* 0.059 0.033 0.026 
 (0.044) (0.050) (0.042) (0.040) (0.043) (0.040) 
Observations 12,339 12,339 12,375 12,375 11,625 11,625 
R2 0.364 0.107 0.342 0.102 0.409 0.122 
 
 
Notes: The table contains regressions of cash to book assets on a set of firm characteristics as in table 3. The sample 
includes only MNCs. Cash is defined as domestic cash in columns I, III, and V and foreign cash in columns II, IV, and VI. 
In the first two columns we include a measure of capital constraints: the percentage of years the firm is financially 
constrained. This is the percentage of years over the last three during which each firm’s internal cash flow (EBITDA − 
taxes − capital expenditure) was insufficient to finance its investment. In columns III–VI, we add two measures of cash 
flow risk. The first measure is the standard deviation of cash flow for the firm for the preceding five years. The second 
measure is product market fluidity as measured by Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2012). Each regression contains year 
dummies. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Statistical significance at the 0.1, 1, and 5 percent levels is reported as 
superscripts *, 1, and 5, respectively. 
 
28 
 
These results confirm that domestic cash and foreign cash are not substitutes for each 
other. The motivations that drive each are distinct. Given the potentially significant tax costs 
firms face upon repatriating foreign cash, it makes sense that the precautionary savings 
motivations that have been previously documented to explain firms’ cash positions predict only 
the domestic portion. Foreign cash is an imperfect store of precautionary savings. Empirically 
firms’ foreign stockpiles appear to be minimally (if at all) related to precautionary explanations. 
Thus, the literature needs to be careful about assigning explanation to the aggregate cash position 
of nonfinancial firms as arising from expected operating or investing needs that would otherwise 
be rationed due to capital market frictions. That explanation appears to only apply to the 
domestic portion of the firms’ cash.  
 
Moving Cash Abroad 
The Mechanics of Transfer Pricing 
If the precautionary savings motivation, which has long been the dominant explanation for 
nonfinancial firms to stockpile cash, does not explain the significant run-up in the foreign cash 
position of firms, an alternative explanation is needed. Low foreign taxes appear to be a 
dominant factor. Foley et al. (2007) identifies that the higher the difference between the U.S. tax 
rate and the tax rate the firm confronts abroad, the larger is the increase in the firm’s cash 
position. The baseline regression in table 3 (column I) confirmed this result. The lower the 
effective tax rate of the firm, the higher is its total cash position. However, the higher level of 
total cash is explained entirely by a higher level of foreign cash. Domestic cash holdings do not 
rise as the foreign tax rate falls below the U.S. tax rate (see table 3, column IV).  
29 
 
Our results raise the following question: if firms are able to lower their corporate income 
tax by owning a foreign subsidiary in a low-tax jurisdiction and generating their earnings for tax 
purposes with that subsidiary, why don’t all firms do this? Holding cash abroad may reduce 
firms’ financial flexibility (domestic cash is a better store of precautionary savings), but it can 
have significant tax benefits. To explain why all (multinational) firms are not sitting on large 
foreign cash positions, we need to examine the sources of variation in the foreign cash position 
among MNCs. Those that are able to generate larger foreign earnings (and thus foreign cash 
stockpiles), particularly in low-tax jurisdictions, are the ones that have a comparative advantage 
at reducing their tax obligations. 
Transfer pricing may be an important element in the movement of earnings to low-tax 
jurisdiction subsidiaries. Starbucks, for example, was investigated by European Commission 
regulators for whether “Dutch authorities allowed Starbucks to use unfair methods to shrink its 
taxable income, including paying a royalty to a partnership in Britain, Alki, for a recipe for 
coffee-roasting” (Kanter, 2014). Underpinning transfer pricing is the nature of the intellectual 
property of the firm. Not only is it easier to transfer intellectual property to low-tax jurisdictions 
than to transfer physical capital, it is easier to avoid charges of tax avoidance with more difficult-
to-value items such as patents and technology (Grubert, 2003). Thus firms with more unique 
assets would be more successful at lowering their effective tax rates and transferring income to 
low-tax jurisdictions. Given the structure of the U.S. tax code, this would generate larger foreign 
cash stockpiles. 
To identify transfer-pricing opportunities within a firm we examine the portion of a 
firm’s sales that it deems “related” or “affiliated” (related sales). On the annual survey, firms 
note the portion of a subsidiary’s revenue arising from sales to the other subsidiaries of the firm 
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or to its parent. We sum the sales across all foreign subsidiaries of the firms and express this 
amount as a percentage of the firm’s total revenue. We hypothesize that if transfer pricing is the 
mechanism that facilitates the movement of earnings to low-tax jurisdictions, then the firms that 
have high levels of affiliated sales and low effective tax rates are the ones that will end up with 
the most trapped cash abroad. The analysis is presented in table 5. 
Looking at the firms’ total cash positions, we find results consistent with our hypothesis. 
Not only do firms confronting lower effective tax rates have higher cash positions, but firms with 
more related-party sales also have higher cash balances. The coefficient on the cross product of 
related-party sales and the effective tax rate is not statistically different from zero. This pattern 
holds for the full sample as well as the subsample of multinationals (table 5, columns I and II). 
Neither the effective tax rate nor related-party sales is useful in predicting domestic cash, even 
among multinationals (table 5, columns III and IV).  
The role of foreign tax rates and related-party sales is most apparent when we examine 
MNCs’ foreign cash holdings. Foreign cash is most prevalent in firms with subsidiaries in low 
tax-rate foreign jurisdictions that are doing significant related-party sales. The coefficient on the 
effective tax rate is negative, the coefficient on related-party sales is positive, and both are 
statistically different from zero (table 5, column V). The coefficient on the cross product (tax rate 
multiplied by related sales) is negative (but not statistically different from zero). While low tax 
rates themselves are important in explaining large foreign cash positions, this effect is enhanced 
by low tax-rate firms’ abilities to move revenue across the firm. A firm’s tax rate isn’t low 
everywhere, only in some (or all) of its foreign subsidiaries. Thus firms who have greater ability 
to move income to low-tax jurisdictions (through related-party sales) have the greatest 
opportunity to lower their taxes and also are the ones with the greatest foreign cash balances.  
31 
 
Table 5: Related Sales Cash Regressions 
 
 
Notes: The table contains regressions of cash to book assets on a set of firm characteristics for multinational firms. Cash 
is defined as total cash (columns I and II), domestic cash (columns III and IV), or foreign cash (V, VI, and VII). Related 
sales is defined as the percentage of the firm’s total sales that are sales made by its subsidiaries to other subsidiaries or to 
the parent. The entire sample is included in the regression in column I and III. Only multinational firms (MNCs) are 
included in the sample in the other columns. Column VI contains only firm-years with zero reported R&D, while column 
VII only contains firm-years with strictly positive reported R&D. Each regression contains year dummies. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm. Statistical significance at the 0.1, 1, and 5 percent levels is reported as superscripts *, 1, and 
5 respectively. 
 
 I II III IV V VI VII 
 Total Cash 
Total 
Cash 
Domestic 
Cash 
Domestic 
Cash 
Foreign 
Cash 
Foreign 
Cash 
Foreign 
Cash 
 
All 
Firms MNC All
 Firms MNC MNC MNC R&D=0 
MNC 
R&D>0 
Related Sales 0.2255 0.2115 -0.048 -0.066 0.2775 0.005 0.4511 
 (0.101) (0.099) (0.059) (0.055) (0.119) (0.109) (0.148) 
Effective Tax Rate -0.539* -0.534* 0.048 0.012 -0.545* -0.503* -0.484* 
 (0.074) (0.076) (0.063) (0.064) (0.070) (0.097) (0.088) 
-0.362 -0.315 0.100 0.163 -0.478 0.098 -0.8725 
(0.300) (0.292) (0.177) (0.166) (0.343) (0.308) (0.433) 
Ln(Firm Sales) -0.016* -0.009* -0.017* -0.012* 0.003 -0.0061 0.0091 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Has Bond Rating 0.0095 0.003 0.007 -0.005 0.008 0.002 0.012 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) 
-0.319* -0.266* -0.312* -0.199* -0.067* -0.052* -0.0665 
(0.006) (0.016) (0.006) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.029) 
Return on Assets 0.028* -0.0811 0.031* -0.008 -0.0725 -0.002 -0.1241 
 (0.006) (0.029) (0.005) (0.023) (0.032) (0.027) (0.043) 
-0.014* -0.027* -0.015* -0.035* 0.008 -0.004 0.0165 
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
R&D to Sales 0.136* 0.199* 0.136* 0.203* -0.004 0.000 -0.016 
 (0.003) (0.016) (0.003) (0.017) (0.011) (0.000) (0.014) 
Market/Book 0.004* 0.009* 0.004* 0.009* 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Book Leverage -0.097* -0.105* -0.096* -0.103* -0.002 0.000 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) 
Capital Exp/Sales 0.082* 0.222* 0.076* 0.148* 0.0745 -0.003 0.135 
 (0.011) (0.042) (0.011) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.090) 
Domestic -0.007  0.055*     
 (1 if yes) (0.004)  (0.004)     
Observations  78,103  13,113  78,103  13,113  13,113  5,091  8,005 
R2 0.393 0.317 0.412 0.336 0.122 0.072 0.172 
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These results still do not sufficiently explain why all firms are not engaging in such 
related-party sales and using this mechanism to thereby lower their corporate income tax 
liability. There must be some restriction on firms’ ability to place subsidiaries in low-tax 
jurisdictions and/or use related-party sales to lower taxes. One common thread in much of the 
anecdotal evidence about transfer pricing is that intangible assets are relatively easier to 
reallocate to low-tax jurisdiction countries than economic value arising from outcomes of 
physical capital (manufacturing, mining, timber, etc.). To further explore this channel, we divide 
the sample into those firms engaged in significant intellectual property development, as 
measured by disclosing material (nonzero and non-missing) amounts of R&D spending relative 
to those firms that either spend zero on R&D or whose spending is insufficient to merit reporting 
(see table 5, columns VI and VII). 
The dual role of low foreign tax rates and the use of related-party sales does not affect 
foreign cash holdings of firms without significant R&D expenditure. Among these firms, lower 
tax rates do lead to higher foreign cash balances, but related sales have no effect (the coefficient 
is positive but small and not statistically distinguishable from zero). The effect we documented 
for foreign firms (table 5, column V) appears only among firms with R&D expenditures (column 
VII). It is only the firms engaging in significant R&D for whom higher related-party sales 
increase their foreign cash position. For these firms, not only does a lower effective tax rate 
increase their cash balances, but the magnitude of this effect is increasing in their related-party 
sales. The coefficient on the cross product is negative, economically large, and statistically 
significant. If the effective tax rate drops from 35 to 30 percent and related sales rise from 0 to 18 
percent (the interquartile range) the cash to net book assets rises by 5.3 percentage points. 
33 
 
Figures 6 and 7 highlight the striking difference in cash accumulation based on both related-sales 
and R&D activity. 
 
Figure 6: Foreign Cash of MNC by R&D 
 
 
Notes: The figure graphs the domestic cash of non-MNC and both foreign and domestic cash for MNC in $B. Total 
cash is from Compustat and foreign cash is from the BEA (see paper for details). Domestic cash for MNC is the 
difference between total cash and foreign cash.  
 
At the beginning of our sample period, when the average foreign tax rate was similar to 
the U.S. corporate tax rate (see Figure 2), firms with R&D held more foreign cash than firms 
with no R&D. Firms with significant related sales held more foreign cash than firms without. 
Over the next decade, there has been a dramatic rise in foreign cash among MNCs that have 
positive R&D and significant related sales.  Among firms that have no R&D or affiliate sales we 
see no increase in foreign cash over our sample period. Thus, the rise in cash seems to be 
concentrated in foreign cash and almost exclusively among firms that invest in intangible assets 
(positive R&D) and that have significant inter-company sales. These results also suggest that 
policy proposals to address the offshoring of earnings and the resulting cash stockpiles should 
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focus on R&D firms engaging in transfer pricing, without necessarily overhauling the entire tax 
code. 
 
Figure 7: Foreign Cash of MNC by Affiliated Sales  
 
 
 
Notes: The figure graphs the domestic cash of non-MNC and both foreign and domestic cash for MNC in $B. Total 
cash is from Compustat, and foreign cash is from the BEA (see paper for details). Domestic cash for MNC is the 
difference between total cash and foreign cash.  
 
These results confirm many of the anecdotal, but undocumented, accounts that 
intellectual property development facilitates using transfer pricing to move earnings from high-
tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions, resulting in significant amounts of trapped cash. 
Complementing Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2015), we present evidence that non-R&D 
firms and R&D firms are not comparable in terms of how much cash they hold. These results 
also suggest that policy proposals to address the offshoring of earnings and the resulting cash 
stockpiles should focus on R&D firms engaging in transfer pricing, without necessarily 
overhauling the entire tax code. Since the effects are more acute for this subsample, policy 
$0
$200
$400
$600
$800
$1,000
$1,200
$1,400
$1,600
$1,800
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Low Related Sales High Related Sales
35 
 
proposals targeting such industries and activities may prove more effective at curbing some of 
these activities. 
As we measure it, the effective tax rate depends upon both the foreign tax rates (how 
much lower are they than the U.S. rate) and how much of the firm’s’ income (EBIT) is earned in  
 
Table 6: Tax Variable Decomposition 
 
  
     
 I II 
Domestic Cash Foreign Cash 
MNC MNC 
U.S. Income (%)  0.042* -0.129* 
 (0.006) (0.008) 
Foreign Tax Rate -0.050 -0.144* 
 (0.026) (0.024) 
Ln(Firm Sales) -0.011* 0.008* 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Has Bond Rating -0.005 0.007 
 (0.007) (0.006) 
PPE/Book Assets -0.192* -0.085* 
 (0.015) (0.014) 
Return on Assets -0.018 -0.024 
 (0.028) (0.040) 
Firm Pays Dividends -0.035* 0.0115 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
R&D/Sales 0.257* 0.018 
 (0.029) (0.016) 
Market/Book 0.009* 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Book Leverage -0.106* -0.004 
 (0.009) (0.006) 
Capital Exp/Sales 0.199* 0.053 
 (0.046) (0.037) 
Observations 12,371 12,371 
R2 0.344 0.158 
   
Notes: The table contains regressions of the ratio of a firm’s domestic or foreign cash to book assets on 
a set of firm characteristics. Only multinational firms (MNC) are included in the sample. U.S. Income 
is the percentage of the firm’s earnings that were generated in the United States. Foreign Tax Rate is 
the subsidiary earnings weighted tax rate for the foreign subsidiaries in which the company operates. 
Each regression contains year dummies. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Statistical significance 
at the 0.1, 1, and 5 percent levels is reported as superscripts *, 1, and 5 respectively. 
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the foreign jurisdictions. We bifurcate the effective tax-rate variable into the portion arising from 
the percentage of the firm’s earnings generated overseas versus variation in tax rates on overseas 
earnings in table 6. Irrespective of whether we examine the total cash, domestic cash, or foreign 
cash, as the foreign tax rate rises, firms hold significantly less cash. For MNCs, the effect on 
foreign cash is 10 times larger than the effect on domestic cash, and the tax coefficient is not 
statistically significant in the domestic cash regression. We also see that income is sticky; cash is 
held where it is earned. The more income that is earned in the U.S., the more domestic cash the 
firm has (table 6, column I). The more income earned in foreign subsidiaries, the more foreign 
the firm has (column II). That said, foreign cash is stickier; the coefficient on U.S. income is 
almost eight times larger in the foreign cash regressions (0.033 versus −0.261). Since the effect 
on foreign cash is much larger, total cash holdings also decline the more income that is earned in 
the U.S. 
 
Changes versus Levels 
Our analysis began with the observation that the amount of cash held by U.S. corporations has 
been rising for two decades. Although the predominant explanation in the literature for holding 
cash has been precautionary savings, this is difficult to reconcile with the rise in cash levels  
unless one argues the world has become an increasingly risky place over this time. The fact that  
the rate of increase appears to be as fast prior to the 2008 recession as following it is hard to 
reconcile with this explanation (see figure 1). Using our data, we can also examine the increase 
in cash separately for MNC and domestic (non-MNC) firms as well as examining the increase in 
domestic and foreign cash for MNCs (see figure 5). The domestic cash of domestic firms is 1.8 
times larger at the end of our sample (2008) versus the beginning (1998), while the domestic 
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cash of MNCs is 1.9 times larger by the end of the sample period. Over this period U.S. GDP has 
risen by 30 percent (1.3 times larger). The foreign cash of MNCs has increased much faster. It is 
five times bigger by the end of our sample period (see figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Domestic and Foreign Cash 
 
Notes: The figure graphs the domestic cash of non-MNC and both the foreign and domestic cash for MNC in $B. 
Total cash is from Compustat, and foreign cash is from the BEA (see paper for details). Domestic cash for MNC is 
the difference between total cash and foreign cash.  
 
Tax explanations can explain the time pattern of the increase in cash and where the 
greatest increase occurs (foreign cash of MNCs). There are two possible versions of the 
explanation. First, tax rates have fallen in many foreign countries relative to the U.S., which 
increases the incentive to earn income in foreign subsidiaries, and the cash gets trapped in the 
process (see figure 4). However, even if the difference between U.S. and foreign tax rates does 
not change, the level of foreign cash may still rise. In cases where the foreign tax rate is less than 
the U.S. tax rate, firms have an incentive to earn income in low-tax foreign jurisdictions each 
year and thus add to their stockpile of foreign cash each year. The precautionary savings 
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explanation is a prediction about the level of cash held, which is why we and prior researchers 
have run the regressions in levels. The tax explanation is a prediction about changes as well as 
levels. Thus to be thorough we re-estimate our regression models using the change in the cash-
to-asset ratio as a dependent variable. The results are reported in table 7. 
As expected, the results are much noisier and the estimated coefficients are smaller. The 
effective tax rates do not predict changes in total or domestic cash level. The regression contains 
year dummies; thus the coefficients are being estimated off of differential changes in the tax 
rates across foreign countries and firms’ differential exposures to each foreign country. However, 
for MNCs which conduct R&D, the higher the percentage of their sales which are affiliated (to 
other subsidiaries or to the U.S. parent), the more foreign cash they hold. The coefficients on the 
effective tax rate and the interaction between the tax rate and related sales are both negative and 
statistically significant as well (p-value < 0.05). Thus lower effective tax rates do not increase a 
firm’s foreign cash in the absence of related sales, but higher related sales magnify the effect of 
lower taxes on foreign cash holdings (see table 7, column VII). 
 
Subsidiary Level Regressions 
The analysis thus far has treated a firm’s foreign subsidiaries as a single entity. In reality, firms 
have multiple foreign subsidiaries in many different countries with potentially very different tax 
rates, and our data allow us to observe the cash and operating in each of the firm’s subsidiaries. 
Not only do firms have a tax incentive to move income out of the U.S. and into foreign 
subsidiaries with low tax rates, but they also have an incentive to move income out of foreign 
subsidiaries with high tax rates and into foreign subsidiaries with lower tax rates. Firms invest in 
and earn income in countries because that is where the business opportunities are. That is why 
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Table 7: Changes in Cash Regressions 
 
Notes: The table contains regressions of the ratio of changes in the firm’s cash to book assets on a set of firm 
characteristics. The table replicates the results of table 5, but using changes in the cash opposed to the level of cash as the 
dependent variable. Cash is defined as total cash (columns I and II), domestic cash (columns III and IV), or foreign cash 
(V, VI, and VII). Related sales is defined as the percentage of the firm’s total sales that are sales made by its subsidiaries 
to other subsidiaries or to the parent. The entire sample is included in the regression in columns I and III. Only 
multinational firms (MNC) are included in the sample in the other columns. Column VI contains only firm-years with 
zero reported R&D, while column VII only contains firm-years with strictly positive reported R&D. Each regression 
contains year dummies. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Statistical significance at the 0.1, 1, and 5 percent levels is 
reported as superscripts *, 1, and 5, respectively. 
 
 
 I II III IV V VI VII 
 Total Cash 
Total 
Cash 
Domestic 
Cash 
Domestic 
Cash 
Foreign 
Cash 
Foreign 
Cash 
Foreign 
Cash 
 
All 
Firms MNC All
 Firms MNC MNC MNC R&D=0 
MNC 
R&D>0 
Related Sales 0.0495 0.0535 -0.013 -0.003 0.049 0.006 0.0775 
 -0.025 -0.025 -0.021 -0.02 -0.028 -0.036 -0.037 
-0.008 -0.035 0.013 0.0505 -0.0611 -0.038 -0.059* 
-0.026 -0.025 -0.023 -0.023 -0.021 -0.026 -0.029 
Related Sales  -0.093 -0.113 0.034 -0.001 -0.089 0.007 -0.176 
 x Tax Rate -0.076 -0.077 -0.065 -0.063 -0.083 -0.104 -0.113 
-0.005* -0.002* -0.005* -0.002* 0.001 -0.001 0.002* 
0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
0.010* 0.008* 0.011* 0.008* 0.001 0.001 0.001 
-0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
-0.022* 0.0145 -0.023* 0.019* -0.006 -0.007 0.002 
-0.003 -0.007 -0.003 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.009 
0.055* 0.008 0.056* 0.049* -0.054* -0.022 -0.070* 
-0.003 -0.012 -0.003 -0.011 -0.011 -0.015 -0.014 
0.009* 0.001 0.010* 0.0041 0.000 0.000 0.000 
-0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
R&D/Sales -0.006* -0.0155 -0.005* -0.013 -0.004  -0.0095 
 -0.001 -0.007 -0.001 -0.008 -0.004  -0.005 
0.003* 0.001 0.003* 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 
0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
-0.010* -0.001 -0.010* -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
-0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
-0.157* -0.135* -0.160* -0.194* -0.003 -0.028 0.032 
-0.011 -0.038 -0.011 -0.032 -0.027 -0.037 -0.033 
Domestic -0.004*  0.013*     
 (1 if yes) -0.001  -0.001     
Observations 71,933 12,765 71,933 12,765 11,347 4,240 7,107 
R2 0.098 0.066 0.098 0.063 0.072 0.057 0.082 
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we found the fraction of cash and fraction of sales generated in foreign countries were similar in 
1998 (see figure 2 and table 6). Once foreign tax rates had diverged from U.S. tax rates (figure 
4), we see the cash has gravitated to countries with low tax rates in much larger fractions than the 
sales generated in those countries (see figure 3).  
Given our data on the cash levels in each of the firms’ foreign subsidiaries, we are able to 
run the regressions from table 5 using subsidiary-level instead of firm-level observations. Thus if 
a firm has three subsidiaries in three countries in 2008, we have three observations on the firm in 
2008. The dependent variable is the subsidiaries’ cash divided by a firm’s net book value of 
assets. The lower the tax rate in a country, the more cash is held by the subsidiary in that country 
(see table 8, column I). This is true even if we include country dummies (column II), firm 
dummies (column III), or firm-year dummies (column IV). When we include a separate dummy 
variable for each firm-year combination, the tax coefficient is estimated from variation across the 
subsidiary tax rate within years for a given firm or across years for a given firm. We included 
affiliated sales (percentage of sales by the subsidiary to other subsidiaries or the parent) and the 
interaction of affiliated sales and the tax rate in the last four columns of table 8 (this replicates 
the results from table 5, V–VII). As we saw before, subsidiaries with more affiliated sales have 
higher cash balances. Subsidiaries with lower tax rates have higher cash balances, and the effect 
of the tax rate is increasing in their affiliated sales. Lowering the tax rate from 35 to 30 percent 
and increasing the percentage of affiliated sales from 0 to 18 percent (the interquartile range) the 
cash to net book assets rises by 1 percentage points. Firms with the ability to transfer price not 
only earn income and thus stockpile cash in foreign jurisdictions, but they also appear able to 
shift it to the lowest-tax foreign subsidiaries. 
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Table 8: Subsidiary Level Regressions 
 
Notes: The table contains regressions of the ratio of the subsidiary’s cash to book assets on a set of firm characteristics for multinational firms used in table 5. Thus only 
data from MNC are included in the sample. Only a subset of the coefficients is reported in the table. Each observation represents a MNC’s subsidiary in a given year. 
Thus a firm which has four subsidiaries will have four observations per year. Related sales is defined as the percentage of the firm’s total sales that are sales made by its 
subsidiaries to other subsidiaries or to the parent. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Statistical significance at the 0.1, 1, and 5 percent levels is reported as superscripts 
*, 1, and 5 respectively. 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
Foreign Tax Rate -0.026* -0.015* -0.031* -0.015* -0.023* -0.028* -0.028* -0.013* 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Related Sales     0.006* 0.007* 0.007* 0.004* 
      (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Related Sales x Tax      -0.020* -0.017* -0.018* -0.0101 
      (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Country Dummies No Yes No No No Yes No No 
Firm Dummies  No No Yes No No No Yes No 
Firm-Year Dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Observations 116,281 125,428 116,281 116,280 116,281 116,281 116,281 116,280 
R2 0.116 0.218 0.330 0.152 0.116 0.302 0.330 0.152 
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Conclusion 
U.S. firms have increased significantly the amount of cash on their balance sheets, and theory 
suggests why this can be value increasing. In the absence of market frictions, firms will pay out 
excess cash flow and then raise capital in the future when and if they need it. In the presence of 
market frictions, outside equity and debt capital may be too expensive or unavailable. In this 
environment, firms can create value by stockpiling cash and using it in the future when capital is 
unavailable or too expensive. Prior empirical work has focused on and documented that 
precautionary motives can explain a significant portion of the variability in firms’ cash balances.  
 The challenge with interpreting these results is not all cash is in one universally 
accessible account. Due to the structure of the U.S. tax code, cash held in a U.S. firm’s foreign 
subsidiaries is not readily accessible nor a perfect substitute for cash held in the U.S. The firm 
must pay an incremental tax to access cash held in foreign subsidiaries located in a low-tax 
jurisdiction. As a large fraction of the cash held by U.S. corporations is held abroad, it is 
important to understand the unique motivations that drive the decision to hold cash domestically 
or in their foreign subsidiaries. The imperfect substitutability is not symmetric. Excess cash held 
in the parent can fund foreign investments without paying an incremental cost, while cash held in 
the foreign subsidiary can only fund foreign investments without paying the tax cost.  
 Due to the imperfect substitutability of these different cash accounts, and the asymmetry 
in the substitutability, domestic cash serves as a more valuable form of precautionary savings 
than foreign cash. As our results demonstrate, such imperfect substitutability leads to 
significantly different factors explaining the observed variation in domestic relative to foreign 
cash. Many of the firm characteristics previously documented to explain corporate cash that are 
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associated with precautionary motives only explain the observed variation in the domestic cash 
component on corporate balance sheets. These characteristics do a relatively poor job explaining 
the variation in foreign cash balances. 
 Instead, the primary factor explaining the observed variation in foreign cash holdings 
appears to be tax considerations. Lower foreign tax rates are associated with higher foreign cash 
positions, consistent with low tax-rate jurisdictions being associated with higher effective 
repatriation tax rates. Firms optimally respond by deferring repatriation, leading to higher cash 
and marketable securities balances during the deferral period. These results are particularly acute 
for R&D-intensive firms engaging in significant affiliated sales. Overall, our results indicate that 
at least two important considerations are at work in explaining the rising level of corporate 
liquidity. Caution is therefore required when interpreting the policy implications of recently high 
levels of observed cash positions.  
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